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Abstract 
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Diaspora 
by 
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The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
SUPERVISOR: Sumit Guha 
 
In this examination of the web presence of OFBJP.org, I show first how Overseas 
Friends of BJP fit into expanded definitions and conceptions of nationalism. The modern 
nation-state is reaching out beyond its territorial boundaries, bringing in migrants in the 
diaspora and reorienting their gaze back towards India. It is part of a larger strategy built 
around dominating cyberspace and exercising power over minds instead of bodies. A 
critical discourse analysis of OFBJP.org shows the priorities of the organization. It is built 
around recreating the hierarchy of the BJP and playing on migrants’ emotional attachment 
to India to compel them to donate money and invest in the country in exchange for cultural 
capital. In doing so, it helps (re)produce a particular vision of India. Meanwhile, its 
Facebook and Twitter pages seem to be built around communicating the BJP ideology to 
its own members. It is not necessarily expansionist in the way that other social media 
projects are, and operates under a philosophy of control that polices what its members 
write. OFBJP rarely posts about life for Indian-Americans in the United States, and when 
it does, it is under the rubric of culture, specifically Hindu. The migrants engagement with 
the political life of India seems to be prized above all else, even as there are indications 
that there is a willingness to engage with issues in the US. I conclude with a few thoughts 
on how the Indian state’s use of the internet forces us to reconsider previous notions of 
both cultural and political nationalism. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Overseas Friends of the Bharatiya Janata Party is the overseas arm of India’s 
ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a conservative political party that in recent years has 
emphasized economic development and cracking down on corruption as its top priorities. 
Though seemingly counterintuitive, the practice of establishing overseas wings of 
political parties dedicated to contesting elections within the territorial nation-state is not 
unique to India. Today, The Democratic Party in the United States has an extensive 
network of chapters that all fall under the umbrella of Democrats Abroad, and the 
Republican Party has Republicans Overseas. The Indian National Congress Party has the 
Indian National Overseas Congress, started in 2001. There are also clear historical 
antecedents in the front organizations established by Imperial Russia and Germany in the 
late 19th century, and it was later perfected by the Bolsheviks/Communists in the 20th. 
Right wing organizations did not typically rely on such groups for political life, instead 
using established networks of military officers, clergy and religious groups, and others. 
OFBJP, as we will see, operates as a blend of these two strategies. It is a front 
organization that is built on networks established by explicitly religious groups like the 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (which itself uses the cadre system), and this peculiar 
make-up has distinct consequences for how it projects and presents itself online. 
Congress, started in 2001. 
OFBJP is connected, both historically and ideologically, to a vast constellation of 
groups dedicated to the ideology of Hindutva, an ethno-religious movement within India 
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that has sought to define India and its citizens in terms of the Hindu religion.1 OFBJP in 
the United States was originally founded in 1992 by Lal Krishna Advani, then president of 
the BJP, as a way to counter the bad press coverage the party was receiving for its 
involvement in the “Ram Janmbhoomi” movement. OFBJP was formed not long before 
the destruction of the Babri Masjid, and its first task was to send out flyers to American 
lawmakers giving the BJP version of events.2 In more recent years, the group has been 
mobilized and, in coordination with OFBJP chapters in the UK, Canada, and Australia, 
worked to launch an extensive campaign to support the BJP in India’s 2014 elections. 
Members spent their own money campaigning, and organized chai-pe-charchas 
(discussions over tea), Google hangouts with party organizers in India, calling campaigns 
to voters in India, as well as yoga events and charity runs.3 More spectacularly, they were 
also one of the groups responsible for organizing BJP Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 
visit to the United States, where he addressed a sold-out crowd in Madison Square Garden, 
and events like International Yoga Day, a major initiative of Modi’s, which drew 
participants from around the world.4 
                                                 
1 It’s important to note at the outset that “Hindutva” and the Hindu Right, for which Hindutva stands as a 
political ideology, does not refer to all Hindus. Rather, it specifically refers to those who use the identity of 
“Hindu” as part of a larger socio-political project dedicated to the imagining and fashioning of India as an 
explicitly “Hindu” nation, a distinct tradition within Hinduism that should not be made to stand in for the 
whole (though that is often part of the goal of the Hindu Right). From Hindutva’s inception in the writings 
of V.D. Savarkar in 1923, it has been a political project, dedicated to the “Hinduisation” of politics.  
2 Ibid. Basically, the Ram Janmbhoomi movement stated that a mosque, the Babri Masjid, had been built 
over the ruins of a Hindu temple and the birthplace of the god Ram. Several Hindu nationalist groups 
launched a campaign to destroy the mosque and build a new temple to Ram in its place. The movement 
culminated in a large group of mostly young men demolishing the mosque, and several subsequent riots 
where a large number of people, mostly Muslims, were killed. A temple has not yet been built, but the 
movement was responsible for catapulting the BJP to prominence in India, and resulted in their most 
significant electoral gains up until that time. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid.  
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Much of this organization was done online. Indeed, the OFBJP is part of a much 
larger story about the way groups within the Indian diaspora, not just Hindu nationalist or 
fundamentalist groups, have used the internet to organize themselves and generate new 
formulations of what it means to be both Indian and American. The result, contrary to what 
the BJP and its allies might want to project, is far from an undifferentiated monolith, and 
is shaped by the successive waves of immigrants, the varied responses of nation-states to 
immigrant communities, capital and technology flows, the ideologies of nationhood, and 
the vagaries of caste, class, and gender. There have, of course, been numerous studies 
conducted not only on Hindutva in the diaspora, but how it has manifested itself in online 
spaces. However, to my knowledge, there has been no in-depth analysis of OFBJP. Most 
scholarly research tends to focus on cultural associations, such as the Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad America, or websites explicitly devoted to shaping the practice of Hinduism 
amongst certain subsets of the diaspora, like the Global Hindu Electronic Network. In 
looking at an organization that is tied directly to the political arm of Hindutva, I hope to 
offer up a new perspective on how Hindutva operates in the West and hopefully generate 
a more complete picture of the ecosystem that these organizations are all a part of, despite 
their seemingly diffuse and unconnected nature. How is the nation presented, who is 
conceived of as a member of that nation, and what is being asked of them? How is the issue 
of diaspora, of the Indian being physically a part of another nation, approached? How does 
a rigidly hierarchical organization such as the BJP adapt itself and its operations to 
cyberspace, where the ability of members to “talk back” is difficult to police?  
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The web presence of OFBJP is a complex and sometimes contradictory entity, with 
actions and organization sometimes acting at cross-purposes to stated goals. But today, a 
website can no longer be viewed in isolation. As social media continues its march towards 
ubiquity, and as it comes to occupy an increasingly important role in ideology and identity 
formation, it becomes crucial to look not only at an organization’s website, but at its use 
of social media. Though social media platforms originally billed themselves as places for 
individuals to connect and as a way of forming an online identity, official organizations 
and brands are some of the most prolific and sophisticated users of social media. This trend 
is only increasing, as revenue streams and the so-called “attention economy” have become 
more defined. Therefore, it becomes crucial to take into account how an organization uses 
social media if we are to form a complete picture of its online activities and how people 
encounter it in cyberspace. It is for these reasons that throughout this paper, I refer to 
OFBJP’s “web presence” as a whole, to include both their primary social media channels 
and the website proper. This also allows for greater specificity, as when I examine the 
different objectives of OFBJP’s website as compared to their social media channels. How 
do they operate in tandem with each other? Are there issues and items emphasized in one 
that aren’t present in the other? And, just as importantly, how can we use the interactivity 
afforded users by social media to gauge how the messaging of OFBJP is received?  
As we examine OFBJP’s web presence, we must also be alert to what is not said, 
to possible voices of dissent, and to how both the BJP and OFBJP respond to these. In the 
final section of this paper, I will examine the place of religion in the discourse of OFBJP, 
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focusing in particular on its relative absence. Though, as other scholars have noted,5 
Hindutva has experienced the most success in the United States by presenting itself as a 
cultural force, OFBJP seems to have been obliged to follow a different path, emphasizing 
politics. Social media offers us an opportunity to see not only what OFBJP wants its 
followers to know and to identify with, but to also see a bit of how those messages resonate 
with the community. The most obvious location for this is in comments left on Facebook 
posts or replies to tweets on Twitter. But we can also look at the types of posts that gather 
the greatest amount of interaction. Using this approach, we will be able to see not only 
what is important to OFBJP, but what its followers react most strongly to. Do these 
objectives align? 
I will argue that the main OFBJP website is primarily concerned with fundraising, 
and operates using the discourse of development that has been so successfully deployed by 
the BJP in India in recent years. Contrary to its mission statement, which suggests an 
outward focus, dedicated to influencing the perception of India in the United States, its 
main concern is generating money for the home organization. When it does engage with 
issues affecting the Indian American community in the US, it most often focuses on the 
cultural sphere, and in particular the portrayal of Hinduism. Occasionally, OFBJP will stray 
into politics, but this is usually done with some reluctance, and most often on issues that 
are still externally focused and impact the Indian nation-state, not Indian Americans 
                                                 
5 See, in particular, Biju Matthew and Vijay Prashad, “The protean forms of Yankee Hindutva,” Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 23, 3 (2000): 516-534.; Arvind Rajagopal, “Hindu nationalism in the US: Changing 
configurations of political practice,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23, 3 (2000): 467-496. 
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themselves. While the website proper is devoted to fundraising, the social media accounts 
of OFBJP are devoted to ideology transmission and shaping the discourse around India, 
extending the policing of how the Indian state is discussed to cyberspace and mobilizing 
its followers to assist in this action. In an attempt to fit within the multicultural discourse 
of the United States and to avoid perpetuating the view in the United States that OFBJP is 
associated with any extremist or religious ideology, OFBJP makes few overt references to 
religion in its web presence. This, however, is complicated by the fact that judging 
Facebook and Twitter posts, these are the issues that resonate most deeply with OFBJP and 
those sympathetic to its aims. 
 THEORY AND NATIONALISM 
A few words about nationalism in the internet age are in order before we examine 
Overseas Friends of Bharatiya Janata Party’s web presence in greater depth. OFBJP is very 
obviously an organization that responds to and seeks to inculcate among its members a 
strong feeling of nationalism, and as such offers an intriguing development in our 
conceptions of nationalism. In early conceptions of nationalism, such as that proposed by 
Ernest Gellner, the political and the national unit are more or less the same, with one 
layered on top of the other. Being primarily a political phenomena, nationalism is therefore 
confined by the territorial limits of the state. Movement between countries and the 
possibility that feelings of social and cultural nationalism might exist outside these 
territorial boundaries were only belatedly acknowledged.6 
                                                 
6 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983.  
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One of the promises of the internet was that it would break down the barriers that 
separated us, challenging the logic that underpins the modern nation-state as understood 
and described by Gellner by facilitating global communication and making the idea of 
national borders seem increasingly arbitrary. This is the future gestured towards by Arjun 
Appadurai in his landmark work, Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural 
Economy. He points to a variety of transnational flows and “scapes” as the new organizing 
units, rather than the territorially-bounded nation-state. These “scapes,” the dense web of 
people and ideas and capital moving rapidly around the globe, become more relevant to 
how we view the world, leaving the nation-state looking irrevocably like a thing of the 
past.  
As we can obviously see, neither of these views ring quite true today. The 
traditional nation-state is still alive and well, its advocates and adherents having proven 
themselves more than capable of adjusting themselves to the new, globalized age. Not only 
that, but the traditional nation-state is now overflowing its borders. As Marie Gillespie 
points out, it is premature to announce the death of the nation-state, though we must take 
account of how new media lessens the importance of geopolitical borders and 
spatial/temporal boundaries.7 While Gillespie points to how this emphasis on the 
porousness of boundaries threatens the vitality, significance, and viability of national 
cultures, we can also envision how these same processes might allow for the ideology of 
the nation-state to spread and become even more deeply entrenched, especially amongst 
                                                 
7 Marie Gillespie, “Transnational Communications and Diaspora Communities,” in Ethnic Minorities and 
the Media, edited by Simon Cottle (Maidenhead: Open University Press): 168.  
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members of a particular diaspora. A nation-state has never been just territory, or else we 
would have had them from the earliest days of human society. Rather, the nation-state is 
an idea, and one often powerfully expressed through culture. 
How does the internet work in the construction of that national culture? Benedict 
Anderson has famously written about the concept of print capitalism and its importance to 
the nation-state, noting that they help create an imagined community through which people 
are able to conceive of themselves as part of a nation.8 Key to this idea is the concept of 
simultaneity. For Anderson, this simultaneity was best exemplified by the act of reading 
the newspaper, a community ritual that helped to mark the contours of the nation, with its 
(literate) members doing the same activity, exposed to the same ideas, at the same time.9  
Without generalizing too much, we can safely see how this same process can be 
applied to internet communication. Anderson himself would later expand his ideas to 
include the concepts of long-distance and email nationalism, wherein diasporic groups 
actively support political causes in the homeland through new communications 
technologies (although the other aspects of nationalist feeling remain largely the same).10 
Thomas Hylland Eriksen has developed this into the broader concept of internet 
nationalism. Indeed, the internet has proven a great boon for nationalism. “Far from being 
a ‘disembedding’ technology,” Eriksen writes, “the Internet has in fact proven to be a ‘re-
                                                 
8 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
(London: Verso, 1983).   
9 Ibid, 31.  
10 Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalisms, Southeast Asia, and the World, London: 
Verso, 1998.  
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embedding’ technology.”11 Identities and national affiliations that may have been lost over 
time due to the difficulty of communicating across vast distances are retained thanks to the 
simultaneity of the internet. This makes it far easier to partake in the cultural idea of the 
nation, from afar. For some, the possibilities of new media allows for the connection of 
like-minded individuals across the distances and barriers of space and time, with diasporic 
groups genuinely challenging the territoriality of the nation-state by creating their own, 
transnational communities.12 While the original conception of nationalism for Anderson 
depended on print capitalism and the spread of literature and newspapers, new virtual 
communities are formed via the spread of interconnected communication tools in the 
digital space.13  
In Anderson’s view, the main difference between long-distance nationalism and 
nationalism in general, aside from location, is the growth of more extremist attitudes 
amongst the members of the diaspora. Freed from the possible repercussions of their 
actions, members of the nation living beyond its borders are able to endorse policy 
proposals and funnel money to causes and groups that are more radical than they might 
otherwise support if they lived in the territorial nation-state. For instance, members of the 
Tamil diaspora might send money to support the Tamil Tigers, helping to prolong the civil 
war that until recently had festered in Sri Lanka. Since the members of the diaspora are not 
affected by the aftermath, their stake in the conflict is mostly ideological. Daniele Conversi 
                                                 
11 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “Nationalism and the Internet,” Nations and Nationalism 13, No. 1 (2007): 7.  
12 Karim H. Karim, “Mapping diasporic mediascapes,” in The Media of Diaspora (Taylor and Francis, 
2003): 7.   
13 Daniele Conversi, “Irresponsible Radicalisation: Diasporas, Globalisation and Long-Distance 
Nationalism in the Digital Age,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 38: 9 (2012): 1360. .  
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refers to this process as “irresponsible radicalistaion.”14 Writing specifically about the case 
of Hindutva in the United States, she states “The Internet allowed the migrants a safe space 
to express a jingoistic nationalism that is not recommended in the spaces of corporate 
America.”15 What’s more, as Rajagopal has shown, the internet allows small but vocal 
groups to occupy an outsized proportion of internet real estate, enabling the further spread 
of more extreme messaging.16 
Conversi, Anderson, and others all point to the way that more radical members of 
the diaspora are able to influence events back in the homeland. However, as Christophe 
Jaffrelot and Ingrid Therwath have shown, the direction of influence is not always from 
periphery to the center. In fact, in the case of Hindutva groups operating in the diaspora, 
the reverse is often more accurate. The coalition of groups inside of India dedicated to the 
propagation of Hindutva ideology known collectively as the Sangh Parivar broadcasts 
ideology out to its organizational fronts in the diaspora, dictating how they and their 
members engage with the homeland.17 This corrective is especially useful when we 
consider the case of OFBJP, which, more explicitly than most groups, is tied to a central 
organization in India. We therefore have to switch our view of long-distance nationalism, 
looking at how the nation-state is extending its ideology out further, beyond its borders, 
rather than how money and funds from the diaspora are being used to influence events back 
                                                 
14 Ibid, 1361.  
15 Ibid, 1369.  
16 Rajagopal, “Hindu nationalism in the US,” 4845.  
17 Christophe Jaffrelot and Ingrid Therwath, “The Sangh Parivar and the Hindu Diaspora in the West: What 
Kind of “Long-Distance Nationalism”?” International Political Sociology 1, 3 (2007): 278-295.  
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home.18 Nationalising processes, especially using online mediums and involving diasporic 
populations, is never a simple one-way process. Just as, in the Anderson model, the state 
is being imagined for and broadcast to its subjects, so are those subjects playing a role in 
the construction and imagination of the nation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Though of course this process is also occurring. The non-profit groups Awaaz and the South Asian 
Citizens Watch have both published fine reports on how money given for what are ostensibly charitable 
causes in South Asia are instead funneled into Hindutva projects. For instance, building a school for the 
purpose of converting members of tribal communities to Hinduism.  
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Chapter 2: OFBJP.org, Fundraising and Development 
DESCRIPTION OF THE SITE 
Framing theory and critical discourse analysis have both been effectively used to 
interrogate websites. Erika Polson and Shannon Kahle used them in their examination of 
‘Destination UK,’ a special online report established by the BBC and designed to provide 
and in-depth look at what was being referred to as the “immigration crisis” in the United 
Kingdom.19 The goal of the site was explicitly to act as a frame for the national debate on 
immigration, and as such had already “compiled and organized hierarchically an overall 
package that makes up its frame of the issue as a whole (emphasis in original).”20 For 
Polson and Kahle, news media represents an elite form of discourse, particularly because 
access to it is unequal to all groups or individuals in a society. This discourse analysis, 
however, is not limited to analyzing and critiquing how various groups are portrayed, 
though that is an important part. Critical discourse analysis takes a more holistic view of 
the text presented. In the case of news discourse, this includes who is quoted (members of 
the decision-making elite or, in the case Polson and Kahle examine, immigrants 
themselves), where in the story those quotes appear (the inverted pyramid style favored by 
most news reports dictates that more important viewpoints be placed towards the beginning 
                                                 
19 Erika Polson and Shannon Kahle, “Limits of National Discourse on a Transnational Phenomenon: A 
Case Study of Immigration Framing in the BBC Online,” The International Communication Gazette 72, 
No. 3 (2010): 256.  
20 Ibid.  
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of a story), word choice, where active versus passive voice is used, and overall coherence 
of how sentences relate to each other.21  
One of the most prominent elements on the website for the US chapter of the 
Overseas Friends of the BJP is its logo, situated in the upper-left-hand corner. The image 
is of a saffron lotus flower, a popular symbol in Hinduism as well as the identifying mark 
for the BJP in India. Because a large portion of the Indian electorate is illiterate, parties are 
identified by a sign of some sort. These signs allow voters who cannot read to identify the 
candidate and the party they would like to vote for on the ballot. Since the BJP has been 
from the first a party aligned with Hindu nationalism and affiliated with the Sangh, this is 
a fitting symbol indeed. The lotus sits against a saffron background, and is encircled by a 
band of the same color, on which is written “Overseas Friends of the BJP.” Beneath the 
lotus, the United States flag and the Indian tricolor are joined, given equal weight, though 
both subordinated underneath the lotus flower. The implication is that national allegiance 
is secondary to allegiance to the party, and given the religious nature of the lotus flower 
and heavy use of saffron, itself a color with a great deal of religious significance and that 
has been adopted by used liberally by Hindutva, that party allegiance is also bound up in 
notions of Hindu culture and identity. Indeed, they are inseparable from each other, 
everything bound by a band of saffron.  
 The rest of the site is set against a blue background. A login box for members sits 
in the top-right-hand corner, and immediately underneath it are options for using social 
media accounts to login, suggesting an interconnectedness between the various online 
                                                 
21 Polson and Kahle, “Limits of National Discourse on a Transnational Phenomenon,” 257.  
14 
 
personas of the people who will be using the website. Pinned to the far left side of the 
screen are the links to OFBJP-USA’s social media profiles. They include Facebook, 
Twitter, and Google+. The YouTube icon actually goes directly to Prime Minister Modi’s 
YouTube, this despite the fact that OFBJP has its own YouTube account where it 
occasionally uploads videos. I’ll be discussing these profiles in greater detail later, with 
particular attention paid to Facebook and Twitter, the most popular platforms.  
Beneath this login is the site’s main menu. One of the most important features of 
any site, the menu is what dictates the range of options available to the user. It organizes 
the information available on the site, and arranges it in such a way that the web developer 
believes will be most beneficial to the user or, alternatively, what the developed wants to 
steer the user towards and the tasks that they want the user to complete. According to the 
tenets of critical discourse analysis, it privileges certain actions and information over 
others, and bounds what is thinkable, doable, and achievable within the space of the 
website.  
In the case of OFBJP.org, the menu options are “Home,” “About OFBJP,” “About 
BJP,” “Join OFBJP,” “Events,” “Follow,” and, set apart from the rest with a different color 
background, a link with the call to “Make a Donation.” The BJP and other Sangh 
organizations are rigidly hierarchical endeavors, a feature that is amply borne out in the 
submenu items of the OFBJP site. Of the six pages listed under the heading “About 
OFBJP,” four of them go to pages containing information on the leadership of the BJP and 
OFBJP. These are labeled “Executive Committee,” “National Council,” “National 
Committee,” and “Chapter Coordinators.” In addition, there’s also a link to the President’s 
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Message, bringing the user to a brief statement from the President of OFBJP in the United 
States. The lone link not devoted to elucidating the leadership structure of the organization 
is the link labeled “Objectives” (although, of course, the laying out of objectives for the 
rest of an organization to follow is on its own a rather direct affirmation of power).  
After the main menu, the dominant feature of the site’s homepage is a slideshow 
that scrolls automatically through a series of photos. Given that the slideshow occupies 
such a prominent spot on the homepage of the site, we can use it to determine the priorities 
of OFBJP itself. Items that are valued, that are deemed to be of importance to the 
organization and that the organization wants their members to be aware of and concerned 
with, necessarily take pride of place. For OFBJP.org, that means Narendra Modi, the BJP’s 
electoral victories in India, and protests against any slights to Hinduism in the United 
States. Even within this, however, a hierarchy is present, with certain topics given more 
weight than others. As of April 6, 2017, five out of the ten photos in the slideshow were of 
victory parties held by various OFBJP chapters after the BJP won numerous seats in 
Assembly elections and other local contests. All of them lead to the same press release, put 
out March 21, trumpeting the BJP’s “Stupendous Victory.” Also in the slideshow are three 
images of Narendra Modi, one addressing a joint session of the US Congress and link to 
the video of the address, one photo collage showing Modi at home and abroad, and a link 
to Modi’s personal site. The final two images are related to hate crimes, though of a nature 
different than what one might at first expect. These images will be explored in greater depth 
later in this paper, but suffice it to say that for now, the clear emphasis of the images in this 
16 
 
slideshow, indeed, one of the main focal points of the website in general, is on the BJP in 
India and its triumphs.  
The other prominent element on the homepage is the menu next to the slider. The 
links next to the slider are “Become a Member,” “India Development Foundation of 
Overseas Indians,” “Indian Student Registration with Govt of India,” “India MYGOV,” 
which leads to a monthly newsletter from the central government in India, “Pravasi 
Kamal,” which roughly translates to “amazing migrants” and links to (some) OFBJP press 
releases, and “Indian Consulates in the US.” Previous iterations of the homepage also 
included a tool that allowed people to quickly donate to OFBJP, though that seems to rotate 
in and out of the lineup.  
The one seeming outlier here is the Indian Student Registration link. The others 
relate directly to OFBJP and their mission, while the link for Indian students has no 
apparent relation to OFBJP. On November 17, 2015, the Wall Street Journal reported that 
according to the US Department of State and the Institute of International Education, the 
number of students from India studying in the United States had risen in fall 2014, breaking 
a three year slide. According to the report, 132,888 Indians were set to study abroad in the 
US that year, the second most of any country besides China.22 Being able to register with 
the Indian government and access help navigating that process would be a top priority for 
any Indian student in the United States. This is also a key demographic for the BJP: the 
young, educated, Indian abroad. After all, the GHEN, an early and extremely influential 
                                                 
22 Last accessed November 22, 2016: http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2015/11/17/why-indian-student-
numbers-in-u-s-are-on-the-rise-after-three-year-decline/.  
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Hindutva hub, was first started by an Indian graduate student studying in the United 
States.23 This constituency has therefore played a crucial role in the growth of the BJP 
amongst diaspora populations.  
Looking at all of these elements, the emphases of the site seems to be on fundraising 
and facilitating the transfer of money back to India (the large donation button, prominent 
link to IDF-OI, and the invitation to “Become a Member,” which comes with a fee, all 
function as clues in this regard. In addition, considerable effort has been spent explaining 
the hierarchical structure of BJP and OFBJP, a reflection of the discipline that Sangh 
organizations have sought to foster. Finally, there are press releases and information from 
the government itself, which will also align with some of the mission of social media. We’ll 
begin by examining some of the financial flows at play here and the developmental mission 
that they fit into.  
OFBJP.ORG AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL AGENDA 
We need only look so far at the emphasis on development throughout the 
OFBJP.org site. It recurs as a key theme, echoing the official platform that Narendra Modi 
ran on in 2014, when he promised to bring his “Gujarat Model of Development,” where he 
served as Chief Minister, to the entire nation.24 The emphasis on development and pledges 
to crack down on corruption obscured what Modi was perhaps most famous for: his role in 
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the 2002 Gujarat Riots that resulted in over a thousand deaths, with the vast majority of 
those killed being Muslims.25 Modi was widely viewed as being complicit in the event, and 
existed as a pariah on the international stage. The United States Department of State denied 
him a visa, depriving him of the opportunity to journey to the United States and appeal to 
his supporters in the diaspora in the run up to the 2014 elections. In the end, OFBJP and 
other organizations were more than capable of raising funds themselves, relying, at times, 
on some exceptionally creative technology to skirt the geographic limitations imposed on 
them.26 Nonetheless, it is significant that in the lead-up to the 2014 elections, Modi and the 
BJP opted to follow the pattern established by the Jana Sangh back in 1965, focusing 
attention on their economic development platforms rather than using overtly communal 
rhetoric.27  
The obvious emphasis in these links is on monetary donations, as evidenced by two 
calls to donate. The quick donate tool is red, a color long associated with action and 
commonly used to grab attention. According to the site, funds donated using this tool and 
                                                 
25 This is based off the official number reported to the Indian Parliament. Estimates by other researchers 
states that at least 2000 Muslims were killed in the rioting.  
26 Dean Nelson, “’Magic’ Modi uses hologram to address dozens of rallies at once,” The Telegraph, May 2, 
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besides the point). It’s an easy way for the site to maintain a significant public profile. It is, of course, 
foolish to argue about what is not there, but we can reasonably conclude that OFBJP.org is not particularly 
interested in bringing in outside users. It is meant for internal users, those within the community who 
already know about the organization.  
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the one in the header, labeled “Make a Donation,” both go directly to OFBJP. The other 
tool, labeled “Give Back to India,” brings the user to a page describing the India 
Development Foundation of Overseas Indians (IDF-OI), a non-profit registered by the 
government of India. The organization was originally established by the United 
Progressive Alliance as a way for members of the Indian diaspora to fund development 
projects in India. The BJP has since taken it over and launched an online portal through 
which members of the diaspora are able to donate to several of the government’s flagship 
projects, including Clean India and a “rejuvenation” of the Ganges, the clear Hindu cultural 
significance of such a project laid out clearly in the marketing for it.  
Sushma Swaraj, India’s Minister of External Affairs, has been particularly crucial 
in this process. She narrates a video promoting IDF-OI and encouraging donations that is 
featured prominently on OFBJP.org. The video opens with an English-speaking narrator 
inviting the viewer to think back to his or her childhood and to the simple pleasures of 
village life. A montage is then presented of children running along dirt paths, floating paper 
boats down clear streams and playing games, laughing. Women in brightly-colored saris 
follow after them, keeping a relaxed but watchful eye. It’s a childhood idyll invoking the 
sounds, sights, and smells of a dream world, the kind that only exists in the realms of 
memory tinged with nostalgia. And, the narrator reminds the viewer, it’s still there. 
Everything that the migrant has lost, that simple life, is back in India, waiting for their help. 
Waiting for them to invest in their village and develop it. Don’t forget it. Don’t leave it 
behind. The frame then switches to Sushma Swaraj, speaking Hindi in pointed contrast to 
the narrator’s English (though her part does include English subtitles), who explains the 
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IDF-OI program and how it is working to develop these villages through various schemes. 
The video deploys the image of a tree, planted in foreign soil, with one on each major 
continent, but with the roots all reaching back to India. No matter where in the far-flung 
Indian diaspora you reside, the video says, you can always reach back to the homeland 
through IDF-OI. You can save your village. 
The video implicitly contrasts the goodness and purity of Indian village life with 
the migrant’s current location, wherever that may be. It is clearly aimed at the moneyed 
sets of the diaspora, playing on a particular kind of guilt: that they live outside of India in 
comfort while the “home” they left behind still contends with alarmingly high rates of 
poverty and severe deprivation.28 As Matthew and Prashad have identified, it is a version 
of long-distance nationalism, one most often assuaged through remittances.29 The state 
uses the emotional pull of childhood to reaffirm its claims on members of the diaspora and 
redirect their gaze and their money back towards India. As such, it fits in perfectly with the 
BJP’s and OFBJP’s larger emphasis on development. 
This vision of India is also a gendered one. Partha Chatterjee has already written at 
length on how the Indian nation was inscribed on women’s bodies as a response to 
colonialism. While men entered and contested the colonial state in the public sphere, 
culture was sequestered and made into something private, and therefore outside the ambit 
of British rule. Women were included in this private sphere, charged with protecting and 
embodying “authentic” national culture, even as men had to necessarily make compromises 
                                                 
28 Matthew and Prashad, “The protean forms of Yankee Hindutva,” 519. 
29 Ibid.  
21 
 
in the public realm.30 This same binary relationship is reenacted in the video for IDF-OI. 
Throughout, very few adult men are featured. Women in traditional dress are shot in loving 
close-up, as are children, while men are almost entirely absent, included in wide shots if at 
all. India, it seems, is a land populated entirely by women and children, in need of men, 
thriving in the diaspora, to protect them and the Indian way of life. This lack of women is 
echoed in the rest of OFBJP.org. Women do not figure prominently in the leadership or 
many of the images on the site. When they do appear, it’s usually in connection to a cultural 
activity, such as a partnership with VHPA on how to raise children.  
It is important to note here that previous rhetoric surrounding overseas Indians 
portrayed them as part of “brain drain” who abandoned the nation and the developmental 
project to work in the diaspora.31 India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru proclaimed 
technology and science to be the guiding principles of modern India and crucial to its 
development.32 Therefore, taking that knowledge and deploying it elsewhere was 
tantamount to betraying the nation. Slowly, however, the state opened up more routes for 
overseas Indians to invest in India. First came the category of Non-Resident Indian in 1975, 
which brought with it the opportunity to invest in certain industries in India. As the 
economy continued to liberalize in the 1990s, the Indian state eventually opened up all 
sectors to NRI investment and offered them expanded rights. Recognizing the large 
                                                 
30 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1993): 121. 
31 Madhavi Mallapragada, “Home, homeland, homepage: belonging and the Indian-American web,” New 
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community of people worldwide who traced their cultural roots to India even if they were 
not technically Indian citizens, the Indian state introduced the Persons of Indian Origin 
designation in 1999.33 All of these moves were to make it easier for wealthy members of 
the diaspora to invest back in India. Reflective of this outreach movement to the diaspora, 
the video treats living overseas as the culmination of a dream for young Indians, a reward 
for studying hard. If it is a betrayal, it is only a betrayal of the self, for forgetting one’s 
roots. For the motherland, it is repaying a debt. Though the final goal is monetary, the 
language used is often calibrated to appeal to cultural concerns. In her appeal, Swaraj states 
that giving to IDF-OI is not just a donation, but a way “to connect to your roots” and a 
“way to demonstrate your emotional attachment to your country.”  
The video also makes the case for technology being crucial to the growth and future 
of the nation. Midway through the video, as Sushma Swaraj is expanding on the projects 
that overseas Indians can donate money towards, the scene switches to a school in Gujarat 
that is identified by the English-speaking narrator as a “game changer.” We then see close-
ups of students typing in a computer lab and performing chemistry experiments. The 
school, we are told, has been funded by overseas Indians, giving other students the ability 
to chase their dreams. In his work, Rohit Chopra has examined the crucial role technology 
has played in the rhetoric surrounding the Indian nation-state, particularly as it’s deployed 
by adherents of Hindu nationalism.34 In formulating this analysis, Chopra uses the concepts 
of fields and capital as developed by Pierre Bourdieu. In this view, the social world is 
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constructed of various “fields,” be they cultural, political, economic, or otherwise. Those 
who operate within these fields accrue and exchange “capital” — in a variety of forms, not 
strictly monetary — in order to advance their interests. Whatever the dominant group is in 
a certain field will dictate the logic of that field, and hence what kind of capital will be 
most valuable. In the case of India, the first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru championed 
the technological field in a bid to rapidly industrialize the country (and in continuation of 
strategies of resistance developed in the fight against colonialism). Since any field is 
situated within others, and forms of capital can be exchanged and traded between fields, 
those who already had advantages in caste and class and who had access to education and 
the English language came to dominate this new technological field.35  
Thus, technology and the nation were intertwined from the beginning, and situated 
at the apex of this new technological nationalism were the same upper-caste Hindus who 
had dominated the independence movement. Though the current proponents of Hindutva 
would no doubt recoil at the idea they were carrying on one aspect of Nehruvian 
nationalism, the fact remains that excellence in technology has come to be an integral part 
of Indian nationalism as articulated by the BJP, and other groups and competing views of 
the nation are forced to take part in this discourse online.36 Combined with this was a strain 
of anti-colonial thought that sought to establish technology, heretofore the domain of the 
colonizers, as something intrinsic to Hindu thought.37 This process created a tripartite 
conception of the Indian nation and its citizens that combined Hinduism, valorization of 
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technology, and nationalism. The cultural capital of Hinduness has therefore been 
combined with the globally valid currency of technological capital. 
This twin emphasis on roots and “giving back” to India is also apparent on the page 
for Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD). PBD, or Non-Resident Indian Day, was originally 
started by the government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a BJP politician who served from 1998-
2004 (and 13 days in 1996) as Prime Minister of India. It is run under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. Its purpose, according to the PBD website, is “to 
strengthen the engagement of the overseas Indian community with the Government, 
reconnect them with their roots and celebrate their achievements and contributions.”38 This 
year’s theme was “Redefining Engagement with the Indian Diaspora,” though it is unclear 
exactly what that redefinition would be, besides as handy marketing lingo. However, here 
we see an emphasis on engaging with youth, with an entire day of the convention devoted 
to the concerns of “Young NRIs” who are able to register for the conference at a reduced 
rate. The idea is to reinforce a sense of community, constructing a space where attendees 
can “interact with young POIs and NRIs from all across the world.” Not only that, but they 
will also have the opportunity to meet with “Young Resident Indians.” Many scholars have 
commented on the fact that homeland politics is most important for first generation 
migrants, with successive generations feeling less and less of a pull towards the 
“homeland.”39 This would appear to be an effort to counteract that effect and use a state-
sponsored holiday as a way to keep young NRIs involved politically. The idea is also 
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reinforced that the Indian community is a global one, but with roots in the territorial 
expression of India, the motherland to which they all can make their annual return. The 
event also becomes a way of keeping the Pravasi Bharatiya rooted in Indian culture, as they 
peruse Indian handicrafts and stroll through the cultural bazaar. Not only that, but because 
this is a state-organized event, they become “rooted” in a particular vision of the Indian 
nation. 
Key to that vision of the Indian nation is the concept of development. Borrowing 
the lingo of Silicon Valley, the poster focuses on start-ups, and in particular the ecosystem 
and policies surrounding them in Karnataka, the state where this year’s conference was 
held. The tone throughout is that of a networking event, a way for overseas Indians to come 
to India and discover how they can give back to their home country and simultaneously 
find their next investment opportunity. Though seemingly marketed towards the entire 
Indian diaspora, the implication is clear: they want those members of the diaspora who 
have the funds to travel to India and to invest in “development” there. In return, they receive 
a reconnection with their cultural “roots,” and become among the most visible members of 
“global India,” ambassadors to the rest of the world and instrumental in the shaping of 
perceptions of India. Indeed, the Overseas Indian is most useful when it is his or her money 
that finds its way back to India, while the culturally-rooted self remains abroad, raising 
India’s prestige on the world stage.  
One of the most interesting parts of the PBD is the date it is held on every year: 
January 9. It was chosen to commemorate the day Mohandas Gandhi, whom the website 
refers to as “the greatest Pravasi,” returned to India after spending years abroad in South 
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Africa. As Vinay Lal points out, this appropriation of Gandhi’s memory is curious, not 
only because the RSS and other members of the Hindu Right in India, with which the BJP 
is allied, has an adversarial relationship to Gandhi’s memory and legacy (even going so far 
as to celebrate Nathuram Godse, Gandhi’s assassin), but also because the idea of the PBD 
and the valorization of the NRI is a clear manifestation of the globalizing trend present in 
today’s capitalist society, a trend that the ideas of Gandhi himself were often in opposition 
to. As Gandhi realized, the march towards a more globalized society would entail the 
acceptance of certain modes of thinking as universal. Undoubtedly, these modes of 
thinking would be Western in origin, centered on growth and development and all the other 
ideas that undergird the modern nation-state.40 Lal goes on to demonstrate how the image 
of Gandhi himself has been used by modern-day politicians as a form of cultural capital in 
India’s dealing with the world. Lumped in the vague spirituality of yoga and other aspects 
of Hinduism, the idea of Gandhi has become a way for Indian politicians to assert the moral 
superiority of their country over others, even as they champion policies that Gandhi himself 
no doubt would have found abhorrent, such as when India developed its own nuclear 
weapons. In the end, by making Gandhi into a symbol of the NRI and globalized India, he 
becomes one more easily commodifiable good, his ideas useful only as far as they allow 
India to build its standing in the world as a modern nation-state.41 The same can be said of 
other attempts to burnish brand India, particularly events like “International Yoga Day.” 
Though Modi and the BJP insist that yoga is non-sectarian and can be appreciated 
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regardless of religious background, the fact remains that it is historically associated with 
Hinduism, and that by linking yoga with India, it is reinforcing the idea of India as Hindu.   
Many of these tensions are expressed in the term “Integral Humanism,” a key part 
of the BJP approach to economic development that supposedly separates India from the 
strategies followed by other industrialized countries, and something that appears 
prominently on the OFBJP site. The term was first coined in 1965 by the Jana Sangh, a 
Hindu nationalist political party and the precursor to the modern-day BJP.42 It is broadly 
Gandhian in its outlook, with a strong focus on swadeshi, manifested as an emphasis on 
Indian manufacturing of goods, a key rallying cry of the independence movement, and a 
call for morality in politics. Broadly articulated, the idea had as its main goal the 
foregrounding of the human being in economic discourse in contrast to the materialism of 
capitalism and the technophilia of communism. However, it differed from Gandhian 
thought by placing these human subjects in strict subservience to the national whole, doing 
away with the ideas of autonomy and skepticism of state power that Gandhi favored.43 The 
most significant aspect of the adoption of “integral humanism” was that it allowed the Jana 
Sangh to soften its approach and place its ideas within a Gandhian framework, making it 
appear softer and more spiritual instead of communal. The switch paved the way for an 
electoral breakthrough for the Sangh, and it is a strategy that has been followed ever since.  
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ORGANIZATIONAL DISCIPLINE ON THE WEB 
 As has been alluded to elsewhere in this paper, the BJP and other organizations 
grouped under the umbrella of the Sangh are extremely hierarchical, with a premium 
placed on unquestioning obedience. This is partly reflected in the site’s emphasis on 
organizational structure, devoting a significant amount of its real estate to BJP and 
OFBJP leadership at various levels. This disciplinarian streak is even more explicit in the 
Frequently Asked Questions section of the website.  
 The “FAQ’s” page of OFBJP.org begins by laying out the benefits of 
membership, the importance of membership fees, and answering some more specific 
questions about what exactly OFBJP is and its activities. However, at the bottom of the 
page are two questions aimed at governing the behavior of its members. The first asks 
“Can I start my own activity or task?” The answer states that:  
Every member of OFBJP must abide by its constitution, laws, and discipline. Any 
activity or task must be initiated with full knowledge of of the local chapter or 
national team. Every activity of OFBJP must be a team activity and should involve 
other active members for positive outcomes. Not abiding by the rules of OFBJP 
constitutes indiscipline (emphasis added).44  
When members first join OFBJP, they check a box stating that they subscribe to OFBJP 
ideology as well as one stating that they agree to the “terms and conditions.” In both cases, 
these are basically the tenets laid out in the mission statement of the organization, agreeing 
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to uphold the doctrine of the BJP and to spread its message in the United States. The 
combination of all of these makes it clear that members are not to act individually. They 
must only act in accordance with OFBJP party leadership, which itself takes its cues from 
BJP in India. It is discipline above all else. 
 The last question on the page takes the concept of discipline and applies it to the 
internet. It asks “What is expected from OFBJP members?” The first portion of the answer 
is obvious: that they attend OFBJP events whenever possible. It goes on to state, however, 
that members “Maintain the discipline of the of the organization and not indulge in any 
improper behavior like writing emails or on social media that tarnishes the image of the 
organization or its office bearers/members.”45 What exactly tarnishes the image of OFBJP 
is left unexplored. Still, this shows the emphasis on discipline extends even into 
cyberspace, showing that OFBJP recognizes how important its web presence and the 
conversation that surrounds it is to its organizational goals.  
 How does this play out online for OFBJP? Rajagopal has already observed that the 
vaunted discipline of the RSS is not emphasized to as great a degree in the diaspora. During 
a brief stint at a Hindu Swayamsewak Sangh (the US version of the RSS), Rajagopal 
noticed that it was difficult to force well-heeled white collar professionals to perform much 
of the grueling physical labor that marked the RSS in India, where the membership was 
often drawn from the ranks of lower classes.46 Did OFBJP have any more success? It is 
impossible to determine that from looking at OFBJP.org, since the opportunities for 
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members to interact with what is on the website are limited. Instead, we must turn our focus 
to social media, where we can glean a few hints as to the reception of certain items amongst 
the followers of the OFBJP, paying particular attention to what generates feedback, 
whether that be in the form of likes, shares, retweets, replies, or comments. 
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Chapter 3: Social Media and Nurturing an Ideology 
DEFINING AND APPROACHING SOCIAL MEDIA 
Scholars have argued that understanding how the internet is used to construct 
shared imaginations of identities is a crucial analytical concern, especially in the study of 
diasporas.47 In their examination of the use of Facebook by the Uyghur diaspora, Nur-
Mohammad et al have emphasized that this identity construction takes place in an 
environment free from state control.48 However, this ignores the fact that the state is able 
to use social media as well. Continuing the argument raised by Therwath and Jaffrelot 
when they ask what kind of long-distance nationalism is at play here, we cannot afford to 
ignore the ability of the state and organizations based in the homeland to extend their reach 
beyond the geographic borders of the nation-state and influence those in the diaspora. 
Physical territory, while still vitally important in nationalist ideology and in the ideology 
of Hindutva in particular, does not preclude attempts to dominate virtual territory. While a 
great deal of scholarly attention has been given to the role certain websites have played in 
this process of virtual territorial expansion, comparatively less has been paid to social 
media, and how it is used to strengthen a particular discourse or expand ideological reach.  
Furthermore, as Natalia Rybas and Radhika Gajjala have pointed out, we should be 
cautious not to view the virtual and the physical world as in a binary relationship, as one 
being “real” while the other is “only virtual.” Networks that are expressed virtually are 
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most often the manifestation of networks already in existence offline, and actions taken in 
these online environments have repercussions offline. Even more importantly, the online 
world is not free of wider structural forces like class, race, caste, or gender.49  In the years 
before and after the new millennium, as internet access in the United States grew and the 
original dot com gold rush was in full swing, breathless prose about the revolutionary 
potential of internet communication was prevalent.50 But contrary to the idea that a person 
could be whoever he or she wanted to be, and that they were now free of these forces and 
could reach their fullest potential, the whole meritocratic myth of the internet, the truth is 
that the very structure of the internet and access to it is dictated by these wider forces. This 
trend will only grow with the spread of social media and the “personalization” of the web. 
It has already become almost impossible for the average internet user to achieve true 
anonymity, making the distinction between online and offline worlds even more blurred. 
This is what makes social media such a useful tool in research: it is the site on the internet 
most connected to offline events.  
Before getting too deeply into the analysis of OFBJP’s social media presence, it 
would be helpful to clarify what exactly is meant here by social media, and outline some 
features of social media logic that will be useful in my analysis. We can start by 
establishing what exactly it is we mean by social networks and social media. Though often 
used interchangeably, they actually refer to two distinct processes. danah boyd and Nicole 
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Ellison define a social network as “web-based services that allow individuals to (1) 
construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of 
other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of 
connections and those made by others within the system.”51 This definition offers us a 
starting point for thinking about social networks. However, as pointed out by David Beer, 
boyd and Ellison place undue focus on the individual, without considering the myriad 
wider issues that influence social networking sites. This includes infrastructure, capital, 
marketing and advertising rhetoric, and, most importantly for our purposes, how third 
parties and other organizations use social networking sites.52 
Social media is the content that is produced and shared within these social 
networks. According to Dhiraj Murthy, who attempted to lay out some preliminary steps 
towards how to view Twitter through a sociological lens, what typically distinguishes it 
from other media is that it is produced by “ordinary” people (instead of professional 
journalists) who then share it within their social networks.53 This is a useful distinction to 
make, since it emphasizes the openness and accessibility of the medium and hints at some 
of the rules for how information might spread, even though it still ignores media produced 
by organizations that are neither professional journalists nor “ordinary” people. Murthy 
does, however, make the point that instead of staying within their own social networks, 
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which typically consist of people whom they are already familiar with offline, users of 
social media often are more likely to connect and consume media from people who share 
their interests.54 OFBJP, as we will see, operates both within a social network and as a 
producer of social media. 
How does social media itself work? What logic underpins is, and what are some 
useful analytical categories for describing its contents that can supplement the traditional 
tools offered us by critical discourse analysis? 
 Social media logic describes how these social networking sites process information 
and channel social traffic, working to produce a frame for reality. José van Djick and 
Thomas Poell have outlined some of the key features of this logic.55 The two key features 
for my purposes are programmability and popularity. Programmability refers to the ability 
of social networking sites to steer their users energies in certain directions. Certain items 
may be promoted or interactions encouraged. Users, of course, may follow these 
programmed routes, or they may consciously choose to ignore or defy them, exercising 
considerable influence over what they see as well.56 
 David Altheide and Robert Snow, the scholars who developed the original idea of 
media logic, drew attention to mass media’s ability to shape public opinion by privileging 
some voices over others.57 Social media platforms, which originally held the promise of 
being a more democratic arena of ideas, has over time developed its own ways of measuring 
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popularity and privileging certain voices over others. This is often accomplished through 
algorithms and other programmatic alterations, for example, the algorithms that determine 
the content of users’ Facebook newsfeeds and the trending topics section of Twitter. What 
makes social media unique is the ability of groups of users to manipulate these popularity 
rankings and draw greater attention to a particular cause or voice.58 It is a strategy that 
OFBJP has attempted to use in its social media efforts.  
There are, of course, numerous approaches one can take to examining internet texts 
and phenomena. Ingrid Therwath has had particular success looking at Hindutva sites as 
part of a larger network system, showing how websites aligned with Hindutva practice 
strategies of discretion, obfuscating the ties that bind them together to make it appear as if 
they are all acting independently, as a vast, spontaneous outpouring of Hindutva feeling 
amongst the diaspora.59 Others have opted for a more granular approach, examining in 
greater depth a few particular web texts. Victoria Bernal examines in great depth three 
websites associated with the Eritrean diaspora over a period of about a decade. Though she 
did interview readers of the site, her primary concern was the online public sphere, 
examining the central themes and issues that appeared over the course of several years.60 
It is not an example of the entire Eritrean online community as it is an examination of the 
“boundaries and connections between online activities and wider circuits of Eritrean 
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experiences.”61 In describing how the Eritrean state was able to exercise power over 
members of the diaspora, she proposes the idea of “infopolitics,” building on Foucault’s 
biopolitics and Mbembe’s necropolitics. “The transmission of power through spaces 
beyond the nation reminds us that sovereignty must be exercised not only over bodies but 
also over minds,” she writes. The infopolitical state manages, authorizes, censors, and 
disseminates information, and in doing so, often through the creation of a climate of 
violence and a resultant trend towards self-censorship, exerts its power and becomes 
embodied in its political subjects.62 What’s more, citing Das and Poole, she views 
diasporas as “margins of the state” where the “conceptual boundaries of the state are 
extended and remade.”63 Information management therefore becomes central to the 
exercise of power, playing a crucial role in the state’s ability to exert sovereignty over the 
diaspora. 
My own analysis will take elements from these approaches. In examining the web 
presence of OFBJP, I will follow Bernal’s example in confining myself to the examination 
of a discrete set of web properties. At times, due to the hyperlinked nature of the web and 
the fact that the OFBJP exists within a larger ecosystem, I will be compelled to draw 
comparisons and examples from other sites, particularly those that are aligned either 
organizationally, monetarily, or ideologically with the greater Sangh Parivar and other 
Hindutva organizational bodies. As Bernal points out, the internet is an information-driven 
medium, but information itself is not a neutral resource. It is constantly being shaped and 
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molded, and cyberspace is where people and organizations attempt to frame these debates 
and dictate the terms of discourse.  
 CREATING THE IDEOLOGY 
Social media has long blurred the boundaries between public and private life. It 
both asks users to reveal more and more of themselves at the same time as it offers a way 
to broadcast those revelations. Using the logic of programmability that is built into the 
platforms of Facebook and Twitter, we can see that accounts used by organizations are 
meant to be as public as possible. As Murthy points out, Twitter is built on connecting to 
others with common interests.64 Although it has an option to make an account private, very 
few people take advantage of it. Facebook, because its primary focus has been on joining 
online and offline networks, has also offered greater options for privacy. Anybody can 
follow anybody on Twitter, while on Facebook, users have to mutually agree to be 
connected. That is, except in the case of public pages, which are what Facebook requires 
official organizations to use. Anybody is able to like a public page and receive updates 
from that page in their newsfeed, the scroll of Facebook posts that appear when a user logs 
into the service and is personalized to the user via an opaque algorithm.  
All of this is to say that the social media accounts of OFBJP are publicly accessible 
and are followed by substantial numbers of people (as of this writing, 947 on Twitter and 
16,370 on Twitter). OFBJP also has accounts on Google+ and YouTube, though both of 
these have significantly fewer followers and the last time either of them was updated was 
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in 2014, when Narendra Modi was first running for national office. Even with these 
abandoned properties, the social media audience of OFBJP is significant, and the accounts 
can be powerful tools to raise the profile of BJP and attempt to fulfill the stated mission of 
the organization: “projecting a positive and correct image of India and its people in the 
U.S. and foreign media, and correct any distortions in the media's reporting of current 
events taking place in India.” This, after all, is a stated priority of the main party in India. 
According to a recent article in Hindustan Times, the BJP government is now considering 
the establishment of an official digital channel to tell the “India story” and country “the 
anti-India narrative in foreign media.”65 So what is happening with the social media 
accounts of OFBJP? How exactly are they used? 
Contrary to what might be expected, the BJP uses social media to communicate 
more with its current members than it does with the greater public. Any broader 
engagement that is depicted through these social media accounts seems to be done with the 
primary goal of solidifying in-group sentiment than with correcting distortions in the public 
image of India. According to the hierarchical breakdown on the National Committee page 
of OFBJP.org, social media and the website are categorized as “internal communication,” 
not external. The newsletter, press releases, and advocacy all fall under the domain of 
external communication. Furthermore, these two avenues of communication are handled 
by two different teams, limiting the amount of overlap.  
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This distinction is born out in the posts themselves. While the occasional press 
releases of OFBJP are targeted towards and distributed to mainstream media outlets (they 
have been picked up by outlets like CNN), the Facebook and Twitter posts seem to have a 
different audience. They do not seek to give a “correct” view of India to an outsider so 
much as they look to spread their own particular ideology and give the correct view of 
events in India to their own members. In being the conduit through which many in the 
diaspora experience India, OFBJP’s social media reinforces a particular view of the state 
to those in the diaspora. As Aksoy and Robins note in the case of members of the Turkish 
diaspora, a person’s perception of their country from abroad is heavily determined by what 
media is consumed. By watching the news or scrolling through social media, a user can get 
a particular impression of life back home, one that may be completely at odds with lived 
experience. Reality and reportage are collapsed and equated.66  
Where other Facebook pages associated with groups like the HSS and the VHPA 
feature images of smiling children and photos from recent events, the OFBJP accounts are 
filled with posts from both everyday Indian citizens (none of whom are obviously from the 
diaspora) and high profile figures praising the BJP’s move towards demonetization, a 
controversial action wherein the government discontinued high-value rupee notes in an 
apparent attempt to flush out black money and force more Indians to open bank accounts 
and adopt online banking. Whereas other news outlets have called into question the 
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efficacy of this maneuver and criticized it for the general havoc it has wreaked on Indian 
markets, none of these perspectives appear in OFBJP feed, except as targets.  
The OFBJP Facebook and Twitter pages delight in skewering the BJP’s opponents, 
especially Arvind Kejriwal. Kejriwal is the current CM of Delhi and the head of the Aam 
Aadmi Party (AAP), which campaigns specifically against governmental corruption. In 
2014, he ran for a seat in the Lok Sabha against Modi, but lost. He has been a thorn in the 
side of the BJP for a few years now, especially at a time when the previous bête noire of 
the BJP, the Congress Party, is in disarray. The OFBJP has made posts accusing Kejriwal 
of corruption, reneging on promises, being blatantly hypocritical, and making treasonous 
statements. These incessant attacks, broadcast out to the diaspora, both reinforce where the 
gaze of the NRI should be directed (back towards India, not the United States) and colors 
the perception of Kejriwal, painting a picture of the BJP and Modi as the only ones willing 
to make the hard choices to fight corruption. Any complaints from their opponents are 
portrayed as proof of their own corruption. 
Kejriwal is far from the only target of OFBJP. A tweet from October 27, 2016, does 
a fairly good job of encapsulating the long list of enemies of the party. It includes Congress 
and its allies (including the AAP), “presstitutes,” a derogatory name used by many on the 
right to deride the mainstream media, which they feel is unduly biased against them, 
communists and liberals, and the “corrupt political establishment.” Modi here stands as an 
anti-establishment figure, with the weight of the rest of the political sphere and the press 
allied against him. Indeed, throughout the social media presence of OFBJP, Modi is 
portrayed as a huge and imposing, larger than the party to which he belongs. He is above 
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the system, and the lone crusader in the fight to change it. The OFBJP Facebook page 
regularly shares posts from a page called “India Against Presstitutes” and posts clips 
portraying the BJP in a positive light from Indian newspapers. Another post on their Twitter 
feed features a stereotypical drawing of a Muslim and the claim that the Muslim 
community does not want a Uniform Civil Code so that they can continue the practice of 
having four wives and triple talaq for divorce. Still another lists several riots that had taken 
place since 1969, along with who was in power at the time. Of course, the Congress Party 
was shown as in power for all of them except the 2002 Gujarat Riots, which the BJP and 
its supporters frequently claim is the only one that the media focuses on. The post goes on 
to claim that the 2002 riots were initiated by Congress leaders. All of these posts serve to 
further the BJP narrative in the diaspora. In the case of the post about the Gujarat Riots, 
they will marshal a seemingly overwhelmingly amount of evidence against the established 
historical narrative, in many cases building their own “online archives” that can be 
accessed quickly and used to further whatever point needs making.67 This has resulted in a 
vision of Indian history that, in its use of statistics and sources, has all the appearance of 
fact.  
Few posts have focused on the actions of the Indian American community in the 
United States or their concerns, and fewer still seem to be directed towards people who are 
not already sympathetic to OFBJP, what we might consider the mainstream. Rather, they 
seem to be calibrated to appeal to an internal audience. For one thing, the posts are in a 
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mixture of Hindi and English. For another, they make use of a variety of signs and symbols 
that would be unfamiliar to an outsider. In November, a few were about the US election. 
Other posts have included photos of OFBJP meetings, the 2016 India Day Parade (in which 
Baba Ramdev, an extremely popular religious figure in India and an influential supporter 
of the BJP, participated), and of the protests mentioned at the beginning of this paper. 
However, most of the focus is still on the political situation in India and on what the BJP 
has done for the Indian economy. When religious communities and communal politics are 
mentioned, it is usually in the context of trying to expose the Congress Party of the AAP 
as being not as secular as they would like to appear, or to denounce Islamic terrorism and 
Pakistan’s involvement in harboring terrorists. The result is that OFBJP’s social media 
accounts come to represent a mouthpiece of the party for its United States constituency, 
but to them only, and not necessarily to a wider audience. They function primarily as a way 
to cement and spread the ideology of the BJP amongst targeted segments of the Indian 
diaspora and orient them back towards India.  
This reorientation is coupled with what appears to be a deliberate silence towards 
the politics of the United States. Besides the pro-forma congratulations of Donald Trump 
on his electoral victory and an odd reposting of video of Trump touring one of his hotels, 
OFBJP has been mostly silent on US political issues. This is even the case when one would 
expect them to take a strong position, as in the case of Trump’s rhetoric threatening the 
H1-B visa program, which provides work visas for highly skilled workers. Trump has 
warned the tech companies who are the primary beneficiaries of this visa system that they 
need to start hiring American workers for these positions, and has hinted at making changes 
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to the H1-B program, including drastically reducing the number of visas available and 
raising the amount that an employee on an H1-B visa must legally be paid, making them 
less attractive to companies.68 As Amitava Kumar and others have shown, much of the 
support for Hindutva politics in the United States is drawn from middle-class technology 
workers who first came to the US on H1-B visas.69 Threatening the H1-B visa program is 
a direct threat to the primary constituency of OFBJP, yet on this, a legitimate political issue 
that could significantly impact its members, there have been no posts on Facebook or 
Twitter, nor any press releases. We cannot discount that OFBJP might be working behind 
the scenes to appeal to lawmakers, but if they are, they are not broadcasting the news 
online.  
MULTICULTURALISM AND RELIGION IN OFBJP SOCIAL MEDIA RHETORIC 
 Though they are the most prevalent, political content and attacks on other parties 
and figures in India are not the only kinds of posts on OFBJP’s Facebook and Twitter 
pages, nor are they the most successful. Far less common, but more appealing to their 
audience, are posts about Hinduism and actions taking place within the cultural sphere. 
Rajagopal, Matthew and Prashad, Parita Mukta, and others have commented on the 
emphasis placed on the cultural sphere by Hindutva and Hindu Nationalist advocates in 
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India. Mukta has drawn attention to how the British policies of “multiculturalism” and 
“diversity,” while well-intended, have opened up an opportunity for Hindutva groups to 
position themselves as the voice of the Indian community in the United Kingdom.70 
Rajagopal has explored how religion became the vehicle of cultural reproduction in the 
US, giving birth to a more syncretic view of Hinduism that cut across competing sects.71 
Hindu nationalism itself, he points out, began to gain a more significant following in India 
in the days after independence, when Nehruvianism’s lack of a cultural ideology made it 
more appealing by comparison.72 A similar process is at play in the contemporary United 
States, with the cultural foundation of Hinduism providing an ideological foundation. 
Identifying as a member of a religion that was part of an “ancient civilization” allowed 
Indian migrants living in India to bypass the racial hierarchies that dictate much of life for 
minorities in the US and instead embrace the rhetoric of religious pluralism.73 This is 
combined with the deliberate efforts of Sangh organizations to build a following in the 
diaspora, offering their own interpretation of Hinduism to migrants who have found 
themselves in a strange land where their own cultural touchstones are more or less 
unknown. This problem became especially acute when their children went to school and 
faced questions about their cultural practices. Their parents, often left without an answer, 
turned to explanations provided by the VHPA and other Hindutva organizations.74 All of 
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this combines to paint a picture of why the cultural sphere is so important for those who 
are part of OFBJP’s constituency.  
We now return to the photo slideshow mentioned earlier in this paper. Eight out of 
the ten photos in that slideshow were of OFBJP victory parties or Narendra Modi. More 
interesting, perhaps, are the other two images, sandwiched in between jubilant OFBJP 
members and Modi being applauded by then-Vice President Joe Biden and Speaker of the 
House Paul Ryan. One is a low-quality stock image of a stop sign with “Hate!” scrawled 
underneath the original’s blunt imperative. The other is a photo of a rally held outside the 
White House, with people holding signs that appear to say “Indian American Awareness 
Rally...Against Hate Crimes.” When I first saw these images, I assumed that they were 
posted in response to the recent shootings in Kansas, where a white man shot two Indian-
Americans who worked at the nearby Garmin headquarters, yelling “Get out of my 
country.” Since it was the first hate crime to result in a fatality in the US since Trump took 
office, and because the shooter was clearly influenced by the rhetoric of Trump and white 
nationalist groups, the incident received a great deal of coverage. The Hindu American 
Foundation, another organization with ties to the Sangh Parivar, arranged a meeting with 
the governor of Kansas after the shooting to talk about what was being done to deter further 
hate crimes.  
This is not what OFBJP did. At least, it is not what they have chosen to draw 
attention to in most valuable real estate they have on their website. In the photo of protesters 
outside of the White House, it is unclear what, exactly, the goal of the protest is. The photo 
is small, and it is difficult to make out what is written on the banners. Where most of the 
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other photos on the site lead to press releases of some kind, this one does not. Elsewhere 
on the site, there are posts stating that this protest was in fact in response to the surge in 
hate crimes seen across the United States over the course of Donald Trump’s campaign 
and subsequent election. Still, the fact that these posts are not linked to the photo in the 
slideshow suggests that this event is secondary in importance to the BJP party in India.  
The final image in the slideshow also relates to hate crimes, though of a different 
nature. This image leads to a press release on an episode of Reza Aslan’s television show 
Believer, which debuted on CNN with an episode about followers of the Aghori sect of 
Hinduism. The show highlights the Aghori practice of consuming human flesh and their 
place within the wider ecosystem of the ghats used for cremation in Varanasi. Though the 
cannibalism aspect drew an understandable amount of ire, the reaction amongst various 
groups like OFBJP and the Hindu American Foundation seemed just as perturbed by 
Aslan’s statement that the Aghori sect was formed in reaction to Brahmanical Hinduism’s 
oppressive caste system. The specific reason for this objective is not included the 
statements themselves, but the erasure of caste from any mention of Hinduism and its 
historical practice has been a long-term project of groups like HAF, which led a crusade to 
have a California textbook changed because it promoted a distorted view of Hinduism by 
mentioning things like caste and gender disparities. The result, of course, is a whitewashing 
of history.  
It is significant that a protest against a TV show and hate crimes against Hindus 
(not that the murderer in this instance knew that they were Hindus, only that they were 
brown-skinned) should be one of the few instances in which OFBJP actually engages with 
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the circumstances of Indian-Americans. The organization seems to only involve itself when 
Hindu cultural life is threatened, and to steer clear of American politics as they manifest 
themselves in the lives of Indian-Americans. Even then, posts related to Hindu cultural life 
are few and far between, scattered amongst articles praising Modi, denouncing his 
opponents, and applauding whatever moves the BJP is making at the time in India. 
However, when they do appear, they tend to generate a substantial amount of engagement 
by OFBJP’s followers. While most posts on OFBJP’s Facebook gain between 5 and 10 
likes, a post from US Representative Tulsi Gabbard (who is a practicing Hindu and has her 
own ties to the BJP) garnered 59 likes as of this writing. Another post showing pictures of 
an OFBJP-organized protest in New York City was liked 40 times and, perhaps more 
importantly for sharing OFBJP’s version of events and of Hinduism (though not the Indian 
nation), was shared 15 times.75 This means that the post was included on the timelines of 
15 other Facebook users, and given greater prominence in the newsfeeds of those who were 
connected to those users.  
Indeed, the sharing functionality of Facebook and Twitter make these ideal 
platforms for spreading the OFBJP and BJP ideology and shaping perceptions of India. 
After all, since, as Gajjala has mentioned, our online networks are often recreations of our 
offline networks, and many, if not all, of the followers of OFBJP accounts are no doubt 
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connected to others who are not members of OFBJP, it would make sense to leverage these 
accounts to push out BJP perspectives on current events or to raise awareness for issues 
that affect Indian-Americans. It would enable them to greatly increase their digital footprint 
and reach those outside of the organization. This does not seem to be the preferred strategy. 
As mentioned before, social media communication is categorized as “internal 
communication,” and much of the content seems geared towards those who follow Indian 
politics rather closely. It is mostly clips in Hindi from news shows, obscurely specific 
memes, and attacks on other politicians — in short, things calibrated to appeal to and 
reinforce the beliefs of the group’s members.  
So while religion is not the main focus of OFBJP, it is one of the issues that its 
members engage most with, suggesting that it is important to them at the same time as it is 
mostly referred to obliquely, if at all, by OFBJP itself. This is likely due to the use of 
strategies of online discretion that Ingrid Therwath outlined. In her mapping of many of 
the most prominent groups connected to Hindutva in the United States, she demonstrated 
how certain major organizations with high visibility have over the years played down the 
degree to which they are connected with other, more extreme organizations. On the 
internet, this manifests itself as eliminating hyperlinks between the two sites.76 Major 
groups were especially cautious about who they were publicly associated with after two 
reports were released by non-profit groups that detailed how money given to the India 
Development and Relief Fund and Sewa, another developmental organization, were 
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actually funding RSS activities in India instead of going towards relief efforts.77 The 
revelations around RSS funding sources and the resulting scandal caused many groups 
abroad to change their names and be even more judicious in what image they presented to 
the public. For example, there are no obvious links connecting OFBJP.org with the sites of 
VHPA or the HSS, two of the other major Sangh-affiliated groups in the United States.78 
Taken together, this means that OFBJP does not post a great deal about religious issues, 
despite their effectiveness, because they do not need to. Other organizations address that 
issue instead, leaving OFBJP free to focus on politics in India.  
It just so happens that those other organizations that do focus on Hinduism generate 
higher levels of engagement, but at the cost of opening themselves up to some of the more 
extreme views of their members. The Facebook page for the Hindu American Foundation 
is a useful counter-example. While few of the posts on the OFBJP Facebook page have 
comments on them, and the ones that do appear are simple and usually reaffirm the message 
of the original post, almost every post on the HAF page has comments. These are often 
highly critical of the organization. One, in response to a post about efforts to end hate 
crimes in the US, implores the Foundation not to “become a tool of the Democratic party.” 
Another, in response to a post about Hindus wearing the hijab and protesting alongside 
Muslims in the United States, came with the comments “I strongly condemned those 
Hindus who would like to raise their voice to support Muslim in America (sic)” and 
“Another pathetic example of how some Hindus are ever-so-pacifist (or shall I say self-
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identity-unconscious) and promote a religious sign that has nothing to do with us and a 
religion itself that enjoys much appeasement already in US, shame !! (sic, again)”  
Comments on OFBJP’s page are never this antagonistic. Indeed, this may partly be 
the result of OFBJP’s focus on discipline in the online sphere, barring the posting of 
anything that could be seen as insulting to the party or its leaders. This move helps protect 
them from the criticism that seems to be leveled at Hindu American Foundation. However, 
it would also seem to limit engagement with and spread of their message. Judging from the 
response that posts about the protests against Believer garnered, it seems that there is a 
willingness amongst its members to engage more with cultural issues in the United States. 
Because OFBJP has not posted anything about politics in the United States, there is no way 
to tell from looking at OFBJP’s web presence alone how this absence is interpreted by its 
members, or if there is a desire for greater engagement with United States’ politics. OFBJP 
has managed to neutralize both the most dangerous and most powerful aspect of social 
media, essentially turning it into an extension of their newsletter. This keeps the 
organization safe from criticism, but it also means that the technology is not being used to 
its fullest potential. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
In this examination of the web presence of OFBJP.org, we have seen first how 
Overseas Friends of BJP fit into expanded definitions and conceptions of nationalism. The 
modern nation-state is reaching out beyond its territorial boundaries, bringing in migrants 
in the diaspora and reorienting their gaze back towards the motherland. It is part of a larger 
strategy built around dominating cyberspace and exercising power over minds instead of 
bodies. A critical discourse analysis of OFBJP.org shows the priorities of the organization. 
It is built around recreating the hierarchy of the BJP and playing on migrants’ emotional 
attachment to India to compel them to donate money and invest in the country in exchange 
for cultural capital. In doing so, it helps (re)produce a particular vision of India. Meanwhile, 
its Facebook and Twitter pages seem to be built around communicating the BJP ideology 
to its own members. It is not necessarily expansionist in the way that other social media 
projects are, and operates under a philosophy of control that polices what its members 
write. OFBJP rarely posts about life for Indian-Americans in the United States, and when 
it does, it is under the rubric of culture, specifically Hindu. The migrants engagement with 
the political life of India seems to be prized above all else, even as there are indications 
that there is a willingness to engage with issues in the US.  
What, then, does the example of OFBJP’s web presence ultimately add to our 
understanding of the ideas of state, diaspora, and nationalism in the Indian context? For 
one, it shows us that the Indian state is highly adept at using its existing networks in the 
diaspora to spread its own particular brand of nationalism. This nationalism fused the 
political with the cultural, and often found itself most forcefully expressed in cultural terms. 
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This is partly due to the BJP’s connections to the Sangh Parivar, and their use of the already 
well-developed network that the RSS and VHP had nurtured over the years. Building on 
the foundation of shakhas and cadres already in place, the BJP was able to appeal to a 
group of Indians abroad who were already familiar with its brand of Hinduism. Indeed, 
OFBJP’s raison d’être is to perform damage control for the BJP in the US after the 
destruction of the Babri Masjid, a particularly tragic example of the power of cultural 
nationalism when bent to the will of a political party. 
 The difference, at least in the US, is that OFBJP’s brand of nationalism has had to 
adapt itself to its multicultural environs. The discourse of multiculturalism and pluralism 
opens up a space for religion as a salient identity marker, one that allowed Indian 
Americans an opportunity to elide some of the racial identifiers that typically are affixed 
to minority populations within the United States. Matthew and Prashad have examined the 
ways in which multiculturalism and the policies that flow from it create a space where more 
orthodox and conservative traditions and leaders are able to stand in for the entire cultural 
community, becoming de facto spokespeople and representatives of what is typically a very 
heterodox tradition.79 It allows for the tradition to be homogenized and closed off, 
conceived of as a separate, discrete unit, separate from the greater body politic. Helping 
this process along was the Western tendency to view “India” as a place of extreme 
spirituality.80  
 Taken together, the end effect is a form of nationalism amongst segments of the 
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Indian population in the United States that conceives of itself in cultural terms, not 
necessarily political. This was certainly the case when scholars first started examining the 
phenomena of Hindutva in the United States and the West more generally. However, as we 
have seen with the example of OFBJP’s web presence, there has been a concerted effort by 
the state to turn this cultural nationalism into a more traditional, political nationalism. 
Perhaps we can credit this to India’s much-hyped though yet-to-be-realized arrival as a 
superpower. Over the years, the idea that India has earned a spot at the top of the global 
pecking order has gained traction, both within India and without. The BJP seemingly is 
attempting to use the massive and increasingly influential Indian diaspora as a way to 
project and flaunt its own power.  
One of the original and still one of the most important ways this political 
nationalism finds its expression is monetarily, as the state and various political parties 
appeal to the diaspora for funds. This is abundantly clear in the focus on donations and 
development that permeates OFBJP.org. These are not just for the BJP, though. It is also 
cannily combined with the sense of cultural nationalism that the Sangh carefully nurtured 
for decades. Now, members of the diaspora are able to donate to India and purchase a sense 
of reclaimed cultural nationalism. Throughout the web presence of OFBJP.org, we see this 
use of cultural nationalism in conjunction with political nationalism, with appeals to 
cultural nationalism often generating far greater engagement and passion than simple 
political messaging. People protest Reza Aslan’s portrayal of Hinduism not only because 
they find it insulting to their religion, but also because in doing so, he is threatening a 
national identity. In many ways, it is a mirror of the strategy used within India. The 
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religious becomes the national, and any attack on one is an attack on the other. It is less 
about politics, about the actual policies enacted by the government that materially impact 
people in their day-to-day lives, than it is about forming and perpetuating a certain religio-
cultural identity. The political aspect is there, but it is not the most important or animating 
part. In an international context, this means that the focus of the migrant is turned back 
towards her or his “home” country and particularly to the cultural life there, and is less 
concerned with engaging politically with their current location.  
 Since the 2016 US election, a great deal of attention has been paid to “echo 
chambers” and the use of social media to amplify certain voices. What has received less 
attention is the way organizations are able to use social media to exercise a sense of control 
over their followers. As has been shown by the policy listed on their website and the levels 
of interaction on their social media channels, OFBJP seems less concerned with creating a 
larger ecosystem or echo chamber than they are with control. Organizations focused on 
echo chambers invite and encourage the active involvement of their followers to amplify 
their message. Instead, OFBJP limits the speech and involvement of their followers. This 
also points towards why Facebook is a much more popular tool for OFBJP, with 16 times 
as many followers as their Twitter page. Twitter is best used for broadcasting and is a far 
more public service. With Facebook, on the other hand, there are more opportunities for 
discretion, and pages are able to delete comments left on their posts that they do not 
approve of. It can inculcate an ideology and block out competing voices. 
 On a larger scale, how does the example of OFBJP’s web presence lead us to a 
better understanding of the relationship between new media technologies and political 
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groups or cultural wings of the state? Even as the internet offers us the possibility of radical 
connection and the intermingling of different identities, it can also be used, as OFBJP and 
the Indian state has, as a way of reaching into the diaspora and reorienting identities back 
towards a preferred vision of cultural life in India. It is a way of hardening existing borders, 
of extending the boundaries of the territorial nation-state into the diaspora and establishing 
it in the minds of people in the diaspora, people who may not be citizens of the nation-state 
in the traditional sense, but still contribute to the nation-state project ideologically and 
financially. OFBJP shows us that our traditional ways of looking at the nation-state: either 
as a discrete, territorially-bounded entity or as an obsolete concept on its last legs, are 
inadequate. The tools afforded states by the internet have allowed them to shed the 
limitations that were imposed on them by geography. Rather than weakening it, the Indian 
state has shown how the internet and the permeability it invites, in conjunction with a 
carefully cultivated cultural nationalism, can in fact be used to strengthen and reaffirm the 
nation-state.  
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